Chapter 4: Helping savers to manage longevity risk by Blake, D.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Blake, D. ORCID: 0000-0002-2453-2090 (2016). Chapter 4: Helping savers to 
manage longevity risk. In: Blake, D. ORCID: 0000-0002-2453-2090 (Ed.), We Need a 
National Narrative: Building a Consensus around Retirement Income. (pp. 437-468). 
London, UK: Independent Review of Retirement Income. ISBN 978-0-9935615-1-1 
This is the published version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/24337/
Link to published version: 
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online
437 
 
4. Helping savers to manage longevity risk  
‘I'm just one hundred and one, five months and a day’. 
‘I can't believe that!’, said Alice. 
‘Can't you?’, the Queen said in a pitying tone. ‘Try again: draw a long 
breath, and shut your eyes’. 
Alice laughed. ‘There's no use trying’, she said: ‘one can't believe 
impossible things’. 
Lewis Carroll (1871) Through the Looking-Glass, and What Alice Found There 
 
A particularly important issue in retirement income provision is longevity risk. There are two 
components to longevity risk. The first is the uncertainty over how long any particular 
pension scheme member is going to live after retirement. This is known as idiosyncratic 
longevity risk. Both individuals and schemes face idiosyncratic longevity risk. The second is 
uncertainty over how long members of a particular age cohort are going to live after 
retirement. This is known as systematic longevity risk. Only schemes face systematic 
longevity risk. Individuals have a poor understanding of idiosyncratic longevity risk.832 
Pension schemes can reduce idiosyncratic longevity risk by pooling the risk amongst a large 
number of scheme members, i.e., by taking advantage of the law of large numbers. 
Systematic longevity risk, however, cannot be reduced in this way: it needs to be hedged 
using a suitable hedging instrument.  
4.1 Introduction 
In order to help savers manage longevity risk, we need to understand both life expectancy 
and longevity risk and we begin with some observations on these.  The main concern is that 
people who underestimate how long they are going to live face the possibility of running out 
of money before they die. This, in turn, suggests that idiosyncratic longevity risk is a risk that 
individual savers are not able – and should not be expected – to manage themselves. To 
protect themselves from outliving their resources, most savers will need longevity insurance 
at some stage in retirement.   
Systematic longevity risk is a trend risk facing the providers of longevity insurance which can 
only be hedged with a suitable hedging instrument. The key instrument for hedging 
                                                     
832
 As the American Academy of Actuaries, the UK Institute and Faculty of Actuaries, and the Australian 
Actuaries Institute say on p.1 of their October 2015 joint report The Challenge of Longevity Risk: Making 
Retirement Income Last a Lifetime: ‘Longevity risk is not well understood by many people and this lack of 
understanding can have significant implications for retirement incomes, particularly as longevity increases’; 
http://www.actuaries.org.uk/news-and-insights/media-centre/media-releases-and-statements/longevity-risk-
ticking-time-bomb. 
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systematic longevity risk is a longevity bond and we consider the role the Government could 
play in issuing longevity bonds. We end by examining the arguments that have been put 
forward by those who support the case for Governments issuing longevity bonds and those 
who are against the idea. 
4.2 Some observations on life expectancy and longevity risk 
As we mentioned in Chapter 1, the principal purpose of a pension scheme is to provide an 
income in retirement for however long the scheme member lives. But how long someone 
lives cannot be reliably estimated unless they have a terminal condition.   
 
Figure 4.1: Historical increases in life expectancy 
 
Source: Jim Oeppen and James W. Vaupel (2002), Broken Limits to Life Expectancy, Science, 296(5570): 1029-
1031 
Figure 4.1 shows that in advanced countries, life expectancy has been increasing at the rate 
of approximately 2.5 years per decade since 1840.833 Being told their life expectancy is a 
                                                     
833
 In November 2015, the Office for National Statistics released data which shows that life expectancy 
continues to improve. For example, a new-born baby boy in England can expect to live to 79.5 years. This is an 
increase of 5.9 years over two decades. New-born girls in England can expect to live to 83.2 years – an increase 
of 4.1 years over two decades. Meanwhile, 65-year-old men and women in England can expect to live to 84 
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completely useless piece of information for someone who has just retired, since there is an 
approximately 50% chance that a 65-year old man, for example, will live beyond his life 
expectancy of 86.7 years as the left chart in Figure 4.2 shows. It does not get easier at higher 
ages. Telling an 85-year old man that his life expectancy is 91.6 years is also of little use, 
since one-in-three 85-year old men will reach 93 and 5% will reach 100 as the right chart in 
Figure 4.2 shows. This figure also illustrates the nature of idiosyncratic longevity risk, the 
uncertainty about how long any particular individual will live. 
Figure 4.2: The variability of individual lifetimes 
 
Source: 100% PNMA00 medium cohort 2007 
Furthermore, individuals are notoriously bad at estimating their own life expectancy. Figure 
4.3 reveals that all age groups – and men more than women – tend to significantly 
underestimate their own life expectancy. While the extent of the underestimation 
decreases with age, men in their 60s still underestimate their life expectancy by an average 
of five years and women by three.  So if a retiree plans to draw down their pension fund in 
line with their own estimate of their life expectancy, a typical male will outlive their pension 
pot by five years and a typical female by three. A key explanation for the results in Figure 4.3 
is that people tend to over-estimate how many people die between 65 and 70, and under-
estimate how many live beyond 80 as Table 4.1 shows.834 To illustrate, the table shows that 
members of DC schemes aged over 60 believe that 20% of 65-year olds will die before 70, 
whereas the correct figure is 10%. They also believe that 80% will die before 80, whereas 
the true figure is only 60%. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
and 86, respectively. In December 2015, the ONS predicted that life expectancy at birth would reach 97.6 for 
men and 100 for women born in England in 2064. 
834
 Reported in Ian Porter (2015) The longevity issue - Mapping the new retirement landscape, Retirement 
Planner, 14 May. 
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Figure 4.3: Individual underestimates of life expectancy by age 
 
Source: Christopher O’Brien, Paul Fenn, and Stephen Diacon (2005), How Long do People Expect to Live? 
Results and Implications, Centre for Risk and Insurance Studies, Nottingham University Business School, CRIS 
Research report 2005-1, April; the figure shows self-estimated life expectancy compared with the Government 
Actuary’s Department forecast life expectancy. 
 
 
Table 4.1: Percentage of 65-year old members of a DC pension scheme with a £10,000 
pension pot who will die before a specified age 
 
Die before age Estimate by members of DC 
pension schemes aged 60+ 
(%) 
Real data (%) 
70 20 10 
80 50 20 
90 80 60 
100 90 90 
Source: Ignition House 
 
Table 4.2: Difference between self-estimated and actual life expectancy at age 65 
Men Women 
Aviva 
survey 
self-
estimate 
UK 
average 
(ONS) 
Insured 
lives 
Healthy 
insured 
lives 
Aviva 
survey 
estimate 
UK 
average 
(ONS) 
Insured 
lives 
Healthy 
insured 
lives 
15 18.3 21.3 23 19 20.8 23.1 23.7 
 (3.3) (6.6) (8)  (1.8) (4.1) (4.7) 
Note: Difference compared with Aviva survey self-estimated life expectancy reported in brackets. Source: 
Aviva (2015, p.6) Making Your Money Last in Retirement, January. 
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A study by Aviva published in 2015 updates the results of Figure 4.3.835  Table 4.2 shows that 
65-year old males underestimate their life expectancy by 3.3 years and 65-year old females 
by 1.8 years, compared with the UK average population. However, assured lives – people 
taking out life assurance – and healthy assured lives will live longer than the national 
average. Healthy assured lives underestimate their life expectancy by 8 years for men and 
4.7 years for women. The general pattern is clear and persistent: almost everyone 
underestimates their life expectancy by a number of years, and men underestimate this 
more than women. 
The Aviva report notes (p4): ‘The risk of running out of money is likely to remain a constant 
threat for many people throughout their retirement, and, through planning, will become 
increasingly important as people take on more personal responsibility. People choosing to 
take some or all of their pension savings as cash….can only assess whether this was a wise 
decision if they have an accurate understanding of their life expectancy. To fail to consider 
how much money they will need for their retirement years means they may risk a life in 
poverty if they outlive their savings’. 
 
 
Table 4.3: Reasons people say they will live a shorter life than average 
 
Reason Men (%) Women (%) All (%) 
 
A serious health 
condition/illness 
64 63 63 
A serious health 
condition/illness in the 
family (which they 
currently do not have) 
14 10 12 
Family does not live 
long 
27 28 28 
Lifestyle – drinking and 
lack of exercise 
28 27 28 
Smoker 18 22 20 
Does not have the 
money to support 
themselves should 
they fall ill 
8 11 10 
Source: Aviva (2015, p.4) Making Your Money Last in Retirement, January. 
 
                                                     
835
 Aviva (2015) Making Your Money Last in Retirement, January;  
https://www.aviva.com/media/upload/Making_your_money_last_in_retirement-
Aviva__longevity__report.pdf. 
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The report also gives the reasons why people believe they have a lower life expectancy than 
the average – see Table 4.3. The most common reasons – which are similar for men and 
women – are an existing serious health condition/illness, low family life expectancy, and 
lifestyle  – drinking, lack of exercise and smoking. 
 
Table 4.4: Concerns people have about old age 
 
Concern % most concerned 
 
Living longer than expected and having 
insufficient money 
5 
Ill health 56 
Dementia 50 
Being dependent on other people 36 
Going into a care home 30 
Dying or people close to them dying 25 
Source: Aviva (2015, p.6) Making Your Money Last in Retirement, January. 
 
A particularly worrying finding in the report is that many people do not appear to be too 
concerned about outliving their savings relative to other concerns they have about old age – 
see Table 4.4.836 The main reason for this is that this possibility is ‘too far into the future to 
worry about’. The table does, however, show that people are concerned about going into a 
care home, but research by Just Retirement indicates that only 10% of people stated that 
they were prepared for the cost of care.837 In addition, the table shows that people are 
concerned about dementia. But we should remember that financial capability declines a 
long time before dementia sets in – at a rate around 2% a year after age 60 and this is from 
a base level of financial literacy that is also very low for most people. This suggests that 
many people will be financially vulnerable well before the onset of full dementia.838 The 
                                                     
836
 Americans by contrast take a very different attitude. According to a 2010 Allianz survey of 3,257 people, 
61% said ‘they were more scared of outliving their assets than they were of dying’. This figure increased to 
77% for those between the ages of 44 and 49, and to 82% for those in their late 40s with dependants. A 2014 
survey conducted by Wells Fargo of 1,001 middle-class Americans (aged 25-75) said they ‘would rather “die 
early” than not have enough money to live comfortably in retirement’ (reported in Jessica Rabe (2015) Which 
profile fits a money manager’s ideal customer?, Convergex.com, 12 October). 
837
 Reported in Ian Porter (2015) The longevity issue - Mapping the new retirement landscape, Retirement 
Planner, 14 May. 
838
 Michael S. Finke, John S. Howe and Sandra J. Huston (2011) Old Age and the Decline in Financial  Literacy; 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1948627. The 2% rate of decline in financial literacy does 
not increase with advanced age, nor is the decline related to cohort effects or differences in gender or 
educational attainment. On the other hand, confidence in financial decision making abilities does not decline 
with age. Clearly, undiminished confidence when combined with reduced capabilities can lead to very poor 
investment decisions by older people. 
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Aviva report concludes (p6): ‘Without a focused effort by the Government and the wider 
industry it may therefore be difficult to get people to really understand the importance of 
longevity in their retirement planning’.   
One might assume that the Government would be better at estimating life expectancy than 
individuals. Unfortunately this is not the case. The official agency for estimating life 
expectancy in the UK is the Office for National Statistics. Figure 4.4 indicates that the ONS 
has systematically and significantly underestimated the increase in life expectancy since 
1971. The figure shows one aspect of systematic longevity risk, namely the risk of 
underestimating the trend improvement in life expectancy. The actual increase in life 
expectancy is shown by the solid black line – this follows the same straight line increase 
depicted in Figure 4.1. All the ONS projections assume that there will be a levelling off of life 
expectancy, but there is little evidence that this is happening.839 However, it is fair to say 
that the ONS’s more recent projections have been ‘more accurate’ than its earlier ones, 
since they involve a lower degree of levelling off. 
Figure 4.4: Actual and projected period life expectancy at birth, males, UK, 1966-2031 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics 
                                                     
839
 In September 2015, the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries' Continuous Mortality Investigation (CMI) did 
report a slowdown in increases in life expectancy over the last four years. It found that expected lifespans 
increased by four months between 2011 and 2015, while life expectancy at 75 showed no improvement at all. 
Between 2000 and 2011, life expectancy increased by three months a year in line with long-run historical 
trends. Tim Gordon, CMI chairman, said: ‘Insurers and pension funds will need to consider whether this recent 
experience indicates a fundamental change in mortality improvement trends, or whether it is a short term 
variation due to influences such as influenza and cold winters - the financial implications are material’. 2015 
was an ‘exceptionally heavy year for mortality’ with 25,000 more deaths than the 300,000 expected in England 
and Wales over the first seven months, in part because winter flu vaccine had been less effective than usual 
(reported in Jack Jones (2015) Life expectancy increases slow dramatically, Professional Pensions, 28 
September). 
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Even if everyone – individuals and governments – could improve their forecasts of the trend 
improvement in life expectancy, there will always be considerable uncertainty around the 
trend. The longevity fanchart840 in Figure 4.5 shows that the best estimate of male life 
expectancy at age 65 in 2060 is 26 years, but it could be anywhere from 22 years to 28 
years, a range of 6 years. This uncertainty around the trend improvement in life expectancy 
is another aspect of systematic longevity risk: how useful is it to tell a 20-year old male that 
his life expectancy could be anywhere between 87 and 93 years (assuming he survives to 
65)? 
 
Figure 4.5:  Longevity fanchart for 65-year old males 
 
Source: Kevin Dowd, David Blake, and Andrew Cairns (2010), Facing up to Uncertain Life Expectancy: The 
Longevity Fan Charts, Demography, 47(1): 67-78 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
840
 This presents projections of male life expectancy at age 65 out to 2060. The dark central line shows the best 
estimate of the increase in life expectancy to 2016, while the outer lighter shaded area shows the 90% 
prediction interval: we can be 90% confident that the true life expectancy will lie in this band. The model used 
to make these projections is the Cairns-Blake-Dowd (CBD) stochastic mortality model (see Andrew Cairns, 
David Blake, and Kevin Dowd (2006), A Two-Factor Model for Stochastic Mortality with Parameter Uncertainty: 
Theory and Calibration, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 73, 687-718). 
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4.3 Idiosyncratic longevity risk and its management 
4.3.1 Longevity insurance  
It should be clear that idiosyncratic longevity risk is a risk that individual savers are not able 
– and should not be expected – to manage themselves. To protect them from outliving their 
resources, most savers will need longevity insurance at some stage in retirement – the 
possible exceptions being those with very significant wealth or those with a serious life-
shortening medical condition, but without dependants. 
Given the primary purpose of a pension scheme, longevity insurance will be an essential 
component of a well-designed DC scheme at some point during decumulation, as we have 
said many times previously.  
Longevity insurance can take two principal forms: 
 A longevity-insured income, such as a lifetime annuity 
 A deferred longevity-insured income, such as a deferred lifetime annuity. 
Longevity insurance can be embedded in a range of retirement income products that also 
invest in growth assets during retirement, such as investment-linked annuities, variable 
annuities, and guaranteed drawdown products. However, these are retail products, and as 
such can have high charges, especially if they are sold on a voluntary basis and hence have 
to be extensively marketed. Furthermore, products with deferral features, such as a 
deferred lifetime annuity, are expensive to provide from a regulatory capital point of view if 
sold by insurance companies. This is because under the Solvency II regulatory regime for 
insurers that came into force in January 2016, the regulator requires significantly higher 
solvency capital for deferred annuities than for immediate annuities.  
To reduce costs, we again need to look for economies of scale within the pensions 
regulatory regime, since this does not impose solvency capital requirements on pension 
schemes. The obvious solution for achieving these economies – as we saw in Chapter 3 – is 
to use ‘scheme drawdown’ combined with ‘longevity insurance’. In other words, the scheme 
itself provides income drawdown together with the longevity insurance. This would enable 
flexibility in spending in the early years of retirement, while also allowing for some 
investment growth, as well as ensuring that retirees do not outlive their assets. This is really 
no more than what large defined benefit schemes do already, but instead of the pension 
being pre-determined, it will fluctuate in line with the investment performance of the 
underlying assets and changing mortality assumptions. The pension only becomes pre-
determined once the longevity insurance comes into effect. The pension then becomes 
fixed in nominal terms if a level annuity is purchased or increases in line with inflation if an 
index-linked annuity is purchased.  
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4.3.2 The optimal age to purchase longevity insurance and the optimal age at which the 
longevity insurance comes into effect 
While longevity insurance in the form of a lifetime annuity (LTA) provides a perfect hedge 
for idiosyncratic longevity risk from the date of purchase, the return is unattractive for many 
people in the early years of retirement compared with that available on other investments. 
This is evident in the historically low annuity rates available for those in their late-50s and 
60s who are in good health.841 Low returns also go some way towards explaining why only 
about 5% of annuitants buy inflation-linking, since it reduces the initial income by around 
40%.842 This means that buying annuities at the point of retirement embeds both low yields 
and massive inflation risk for the remainder of retirement. 
For the purpose of DC decumulation, it is helpful to separate the period prior to longevity 
insurance coming into effect and the period after. As a rough guide, we classify those who 
are aged between 55 and 75-80, in good health, with dependants, as being in the pre-
longevity insurance stage of their retirement.843  As we saw in Chapter 2 (Section 2.5), at 
some point between the ages of 75 and 80, it will become optimal for members of this 
group to switch between income drawdown and a LTA, since the implied return on a LTA at 
these ages exceeds any realistic return available on growth assets such as equities.844 This is 
because, as the upward-sloping curved line in Figure 4.6 shows, the mortality premium – 
which is closely related to the corresponding age-specific mortality rate – built into annuity 
rates increases with age.845 This means that it is optimal to annuitise around the time that 
the mortality premium exceeds the equity premium – the horizontal line in the figure.846 
This explains why it might well be sensible for healthy retirees with sufficient resources to 
                                                     
841
 The low annuity rates are due to both the relentless increase in life expectancy and the historically low long 
term interest rates that resulted from the programme of quantitative easing introduced by the Bank of 
England in March 2009 to save the UK banking system from the effects of the Global Financial Crisis which 
started in 2007-08. 
842
 Money Advice Service quotations, 5 January 2015. 
843
 As previously mentioned, we do not address the needs of late retirement, when long-term care may be 
required. This is because, at present, DC pots are too small to accommodate long-term care (LTC) planning. In 
due course, this will become an important problem to solve in association with the pension problem. 
844 
By optimal, we mean that, if people were behaving rationally, they would be better off making this switch 
than leaving it to chance whether they run out of money before they die (assuming no bequest motive). See 
Menahem Yaari (1965). Uncertain Lifetime, Life Insurance and the Theory of the Consumer, Review of 
Economic Studies, 32, 137–50. 
845
 Figure 4.6 repeats Figure 2.3 (The Milevsky switching rule) from Chapter 2. 
846
 We can think of the return on an annuity as being equal to the return on a risk-free asset such as a 
government bond plus a mortality premium to those who survive. The mortality premium is related to the 
mortality rate during the year: those who die during the year no longer receive their annuity and this is then 
shared out amongst survivors. We can think of the return on growth assets such as equities as equalling the 
risk-free rate plus the equity premium, the additional return that investors require to hold risky assets rather 
than risk-free government bonds. The mortality premium =  qx  / (1 - qx), where qx is the mortality rate at age x. 
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wait until they are in their late 70s or early 80s before annuitising.847  People in poor health 
should, of course, purchase an enhanced annuity.  
 
 
Figure 4.6: The optimal age to draw longevity-insured income 
 
However, despite being optimal, this does not mean that people will be keen to buy 
longevity insurance, especially if they are not particularly concerned about living longer than 
expected and having insufficient money to live on as Table 4.4 appears to indicate. It might 
therefore be necessary to draw on the lessons of behavioural economics to find ways of 
nudging pension scheme members into buying longevity insurance when the time is right. 
One possibility is to use auto-enrolment onto a default decumulation strategy, as we 
discussed in Chapter 3. We also need to be innovative in annuity design848 and behavioural 
economics suggests that capital protected or cash-back annuities might be attractive to 
scheme members. Similarly, paying for longevity insurance in instalments might be more 
acceptable than paying for it upfront at the point of retirement. People also need to be 
                                                     
847
 This is strictly true for someone who is risk-neutral and makes investment decisions on the basis of 
expected returns only: the expected return on annuities will exceed the expected return on equities after this 
point.  For someone who is risk averse, the optimal age will be earlier than this. For someone who is extremely 
risk averse and does not like any income volatility in retirement, the optimal age to purchase longevity 
insurance will be at the point of retirement. See David Blake, Andrew Cairns, and Kevin Dowd (2003) 
PensionMetrics 2:  Stochastic Pension Plan Design during the Distribution Phase, Insurance: Mathematics & 
Economics, 33, 29-47. 
848
 We also need to be innovative in branding, given the current unpopularity of products called ‘annuities’ and 
rebrand them as ‘guaranteed income for life’ products. 
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continually warned about the very real possibility that they will finding themselves in the 
upper part of the longevity fanchart in Figure 4.5. 
4.4 Systematic longevity risk and its management 
Idiosyncratic longevity risk – the uncertainty over how long any particular individual is going 
to live after retirement – can be reduced by pooling and taking advantage of the law of large 
numbers. This is what insurance companies do when they sell annuities to a large group of 
people. Systematic longevity risk – uncertainty over how long members of an entire age 
cohort are going to live after retirement – cannot be reduced in this way. It is a trend risk 
and can only be hedged with a suitable hedging instrument. The key instrument for hedging 
systematic longevity risk is a longevity bond, in precisely the same way that an index-linked 
bond can be used to hedge inflation risk.849  
 
Figure 4.7: Survivor fan chart - Males aged 65 
 
Source: Derived from the Cairns-Blake-Dowd stochastic mortality model, estimated on English and Welsh male 
mortality data for 65-year olds over the period 1991-2006 
 
In order to see how a longevity bond can hedge systematic longevity risk, we need to both 
quantify longevity risk and identify where it is concentrated. Figure 4.7 presents a survivor 
fan chart.850 This shows the uncertainty surrounding projections of the number of survivors 
to each age from the cohort of males from the national population of England and Wales 
who retire aged 65. The grey bars indicate the 90% confidence interval on the projected 
survivor rate for each age out to 115. The line in the middle of each bar indicates the 
expected proportion of the cohort to survive to each age. The figure shows that there is 
                                                     
849
 It can also be hedged with a longevity swap in the same way that inflation can be hedged with an inflation 
swap. In fact, a longevity bond is the combination of an annuity bond and a longevity swap. 
850
 See David Blake, Andrew Cairns and Kevin Dowd (2008), Longevity Risk and the Grim Reaper’s Toxic Tail: 
The Survivor Fan Charts, Insurance: Mathematics & Economics, 42: 1062-66.  
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little uncertainty out to age 75: we can be fairly confident that approximately 19% will have 
died by 75. The uncertainty peaks at age 93: the prediction interval band is widest at this 
age. The best estimate is that 36% will survive to age 90, but it could be anywhere between 
30% and 41%. This is a very large range. The figure also shows the extent of the so-called 
‘tail risk’ after age 90: there is some probability – even if small – that some members of this 
cohort will live beyond 110. 
A survivor fan chart is very useful to a pension scheme or annuity provider since it shows the 
likely range in the numbers of pensioners or annuitants from a given birth cohort surviving 
to each age. If more survive to each age than was expected, the pension scheme or annuity 
provider has to make higher total pension or annuity payments than was anticipated. The 
opposite holds if fewer survive to each age than was anticipated.  
We will now show how a longevity bond with the following characteristics can help to hedge 
systematic longevity risk: 
 The bond pays coupons that decline over time in line with the actual mortality 
experience of a cohort of the population, say 65-year-old males from the national 
population: so the coupons payable at age 75, for example, will depend on the 
proportion of 65-year-old males who survive to age 75 
 Coupon payments are not made for ages for which longevity risk is low: so, for 
example, the first coupon might not be paid until the cohort reaches age 75 (such a 
bond would be a deferred longevity bond)851 
 The coupon payments continue until the maturity date of the bond which might, for 
example, be 40 years after the issue date when the cohort of males reaches age 105 
 The final coupon incorporates a terminal payment equal to the discounted value of 
the sum of the post-105 survivor rates to account for those who survive beyond age 
105. The terminal payment is calculated on the maturity date of the bond and will 
depend on the numbers of the cohort still alive at that time and projections of their 
remaining survivorship. It is intended to avoid the payment of trivial sums at very 
high ages 
 The bond pays coupons only and has no principal repayment (i.e., is an annuity 
bond). 
 
Figure 4.8 shows the possible range of coupon payments on a deferred longevity bond 
based on the national population of English and Welsh males who are aged 65. Such a bond 
would provide a hedge for the systematic longevity risk faced by pension schemes and 
annuity providers. If population survivorship is higher at each age than was expected, the 
bond pays out higher coupons. This is what pension schemes and annuity providers need in 
order to help match the higher than expected pensions and annuity payments they have to 
                                                     
851
 There is no point in paying for insurance when the risk is low. 
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make. If, on the other hand, survivorship is lower at each age than was expected, the bond 
pays out lower coupons. But the pension schemes and annuity providers are not likely to 
mind this, since their pensions and annuity payments are also likely to be lower. 
 
Figure 4.8: Deferred longevity bond for male aged 65 with 10-year deferment 
 
 
Note: Longevity bond is payable from age 75 with terminal payment at age 105 to cover post-105 longevity risk 
 
However, it is important to recognise that the bond will only provide a perfect hedge for the 
systematic longevity risk faced by pension schemes and annuity providers if the scheme 
members and annuitants have exactly the same mortality experience over time as the 
cohort underlying the bond. If the scheme members and annuitants have a mortality 
experience that differs from that of the national population, this will introduce basis risk.852  
In practice, there will always be some basis risk. One reason for this is that pension schemes 
and annuity books have far fewer members than the national population and will therefore 
experience greater random variation risk than the national population and this is likely to 
cause the mortality experience of a sub-population to diverge from that of the national 
population over time, even if they have the same mortality profile at the outset.  
Another reason is that most pension schemes and annuity books will not have the same 
mortality profile as the national population, even to begin with. There can be differences in 
age, gender and socio-economic composition. Different birth cohorts have different survivor 
                                                     
852
 This is the risk that the ‘underlying’ – in this case, the survivor rates of the particular population being 
hedged – does not move in line with the hedging instrument – which, in this case, depends on the survivor 
rates of the national population.  
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rates to each age. While survivor rates to each age tend to increase over time, in line with 
the trend improvement in longevity, they do not do so uniformly: some birth cohorts 
experience faster improvements than others.853 Females, on average, live longer than males. 
Professionals tend to live longer than white-collar workers who, in turn, tend to live longer 
than blue-collar and manual workers. But it is not simply the differences in life expectancies 
between these various groups that are important, it is unexpected changes in the trends in 
their survivorship experience that causes basis risk.  
Yet another reason for basis risk involves the difference between ‘lives’ and ‘amounts’. A 
population longevity index854 will weight each life equally, but members of the higher socio-
economic groups will tend to have higher pensions and annuities than members of the 
lower socio-economic groups. They are also more likely to have multiple pensions and 
annuities. The directors of, say, a small engineering company are likely to represent a large 
share of the company’s pension scheme liabilities and are more likely to live longer than the 
average member. All these factors will increase basis risk and its complexity.  
Although basis risk is important, it is a second-order risk compared with systematic longevity 
risk itself. It can also be hedged by having a small number of suitably designed hedging 
instruments. In theory, there could be a longevity bond for both males and females, for each 
age and for each socio-economic group. Such granularity of the longevity bond market 
would allow a high degree of hedge effectiveness to be achieved. But it would also result in 
negligible liquidity or pricing transparency: the more bonds there are, the less trading there 
will be in each bond and the less frequently the bonds will be priced by the market. As is the 
case in other markets – especially derivatives markets – a small number of suitably designed 
bonds should provide an appropriate balance between hedge effectiveness, liquidity and 
pricing transparency. 855 
Not only are longevity bonds useful for hedging systematic longevity risk once retirees are 
drawing a longevity-insured income, they could be used to hedge systematic longevity risk 
and long-term investment risk in the period leading up to this point. As we discussed in 
Chapter 2, DC schemes traditionally used a lifestyle investment strategy involving target-
date funds. This involves a high weighting in equities and other growth assets in the ‘growth 
stage’ of the accumulation process in order to benefit from the equity premium. There is 
then a systematic switch to less volatile assets, typically long-dated fixed-income bonds, 
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during the ‘consolidation stage’856 of the accumulation process – the so-called glide path – 
in order to reduce the volatility of the lifetime retirement income secured at retirement. It 
used to be the case that most people drew their longevity-insured income at the same time 
as they retired. The 2014 Budget is likely to lead to some DC scheme members deferring 
drawing a longevity-insured income from their DC scheme until later in their retirement, 
while keeping the fund invested in growth assets and using income drawdown in the 
interim. Nevertheless, it would still be useful to hedge systematic longevity risk during this 
period by holding some of the fund in longevity bonds.857   
4.5 Why should the Government issue longevity bonds ?858 
In principle, longevity bonds could be issued by private-sector organisations. It has been 
argued that pharmaceutical companies would be natural issuers, since their revenues are 
positively linked to survivorship: the longer people live, the more they will spend on 
medicines.859 While this is true, the scale of the demand for longevity bonds far exceeds 
conceivable private-sector supply from companies such as pharmaceuticals. Further, there 
would be significant credit risk associated with the private-sector issuance of an instrument 
intended to hedge a systematic risk many years into the future. In practice, we would argue 
that the only realistic issuer of longevity bonds in scale is the Government.860 
We believe that there are three important reasons why the Government should engage in 
sharing longevity risk with the private sector. It: 
 has an interest in ensuring there is an efficient annuity market 
 has an interest in ensuring there is an efficient capital market for longevity risk 
transfers 
 is best placed to engage in intergenerational risk sharing, such as by providing tail 
risk protection against systematic trend risk. 
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4.5.1  An efficient annuity market for pensioners 
The Government has an interest in ensuring there is an efficient annuity market, given its 
desire to encourage retirement savings in DC pension schemes that need annuities to turn 
pension savings into guaranteed lifetime retirement income. If the private sector is unable 
to hedge systematic longevity risk, it increases the likelihood that insurance companies stop 
selling annuities, especially deferred annuities, or increase annuity prices which would 
reduce pensioner income in retirement.  
A consequence of the above is that Governments might find themselves having to pay 
additional means-tested benefits to supplement pensioners’ incomes, as well as receiving 
lower income tax and expenditure taxes (such as value added tax) from pensioners due to 
their lower incomes.861 This will, ceteris paribus, lead to higher taxes on the working 
population. This outcome will therefore not be popular with workers or pensioners. Further, 
workers are likely to reduce savings into DC pension schemes. Those that do continue to 
save in DC schemes will face even greater uncertainty about their prospective pension 
income, since an efficient private-sector annuity market might no longer be in existence 
when they retire. 
4.5.2 An efficient capital market for longevity risk transfers 
The capital markets have a key role to help ensure there is an efficient annuity market and 
to help to reduce concentration risk. It can therefore also be argued that the Government 
has an interest in ensuring there is an efficient capital market for longevity risk transfers. 
There are two areas where Government support is required. 
First, the Government can help with the construction of national longevity indices. It is for 
reasons of accuracy that longevity indices would most likely have to be based on national 
mortality data. A key component of the success of the new capital market will be the timely 
publication of accurate and independently calculated longevity indices. The longevity indices 
would cover mortality rates, survivor rates and life expectancies for both males and females.  
Only the Government has access to the information necessary to produce these indices on 
account of the legal requirement to report deaths and related information such as dates of 
death and birth and gender to an official agency, which in the UK is the General Register 
Office of Births, Marriages and Deaths.862 Further, only the Government has access to the 
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information needed to estimate the size of the exposed population. In the UK, this is 
currently derived from decadal censuses with annual updates between censuses based on 
reported deaths and estimated migration flows. However, the resulting estimates are not 
accurate enough at high ages. It is important to be able to track a cohort over time, 
particularly at high ages: the Government is in a unique position to do this, since it makes 
social security pension payments to almost every old person and needs to keep good 
records to do this. While longevity indices based on social class would be useful, the social 
class of a deceased person is not recorded at the time of death and while attempts have 
been made to construct social class indices, based on factors such as post code, these lack 
the accuracy of national indices. A similar argument would hold for longevity indices based 
on amounts rather than lives. 
Second, the Government can make an important contribution by issuing longevity bonds to 
facilitate price discovery, thereby encouraging capital market development. Longevity risk is 
not currently actively traded in the capital markets, so we do not have a good estimate of its 
market price or premium.863 But if the Government issued a small number of longevity 
bonds, this would help to establish and maintain the market-clearing ‘price points’ for 
longevity risk at key ages and future dates, and hence establish a market price for longevity 
risk. In other words, the bonds would help to establish the riskless term structure for 
survival rates for ages above 65 for future years. There is a clear analogy with the fixed-
income and index-linked bond markets. In these markets, the issuance of government bonds 
helped to establish the riskless term structures for interest rates and inflation rate 
expectations, respectively, for terms out to 50 years or more. The private sector was then 
able to issue corporate fixed-income and index-linked bonds with different credit risks (AAA, 
AA, etc.) and establish credit term structures above the riskless benchmark curves.  
The establishment of a market price for longevity risk would be particularly useful for EU 
insurance companies operating under Solvency II. The maximum longevity risk premium 
that an annuity provider would be willing to pay to buy a longevity bond would be related to 
the level of capital that the regulators agree can be released as a result of holding the 
longevity bond to back annuity liabilities.864  
The establishment of price points will also help to facilitate the capital market development 
of longevity swaps and other longevity derivatives similar to the interest-rate and inflation 
swaps that developed in the fixed-income and index-linked bond markets. Market 
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participants were able to use market interest-rate and inflation expectations rather than 
projections from models. The same would happen in the longevity swaps market. The 
longevity swaps market began to develop in the UK in 2007-09 with eight publicly 
announced swaps involving six annuity providers and two pension funds. A number of global 
investment banks and reinsurers intermediated the deals – J.P. Morgan, Deutsche Bank, 
RBS, Credit Suisse, Goldman Sachs, Société Générale, and SwissRe – and the longevity risk 
was passed through to investors – such as insurance-linked securities (ILS) investors, hedge 
funds, sovereign wealth funds, family offices and endowments – attracted by a new asset 
class that is uncorrelated with traditional asset classes, such as equities, bonds and real 
estate. More than £60bn of longevity swaps have been executed in the UK since 2007.  
4.5.3 Intergenerational risk sharing  
The Government is the only agency in society that can engage in intergenerational risk 
sharing on a large scale and enforce intergenerational contracts.865 This is important, given 
that longevity risk is a risk that crosses a number of generations.  
This is how intergenerational risk sharing operates. The Government would receive a 
longevity risk premium by issuing longevity bonds.  In effect, the current retired population 
pays future generations an insurance premium to hedge its systematic longevity risk. If, in 
equilibrium, the risk premium is sufficient to ensure that the generation bearing the risk is 
adequately compensated, then each generation is treated fairly. The current generation of 
pensioners derives benefit from annuity companies being able to use government-issued 
longevity bonds to provide better value annuities. The premium that this generation pays 
for taking away the longevity risk is effectively the premium required to compensate the 
younger generations to whom the Government is passing on the risk in the form of possible 
higher taxes to enable the Government to continue paying state pensions to members of 
the current generation who live longer than expected. 
A key role for Government in this context is to provide a hedge for systematic longevity risk 
by offering tail risk protection against trend risk. Once the market for longevity bonds has 
matured, in the sense of producing stable and reliable price points in the age range 65-90, 
the capital markets can take over responsibility for providing the necessary hedging capacity 
in this age range using longevity securities and derivatives. All that might then be needed 
would be for the Government to provide a continuous supply of deferred tail longevity 
bonds with payments starting from age 90 in order to allow pension schemes and insurers 
to hedge their tail risk.866 Figure 4.9 illustrates the cash flows on such a bond.  These bonds 
will be necessary on a permanent basis, since the capital that annuity providers would be 
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required by the regulator to post in order to cover this risk would be very high in the 
absence of a close matching asset. The bonds are also necessary because the investors who 
have recently become interested in taking the other side of the longevity swaps market 
have no appetite for hedging long-duration tail longevity risk. They would also be needed to 
help kick start a deferred annuity market. 
 
Figure 4.9: Deferred tail longevity bond for male aged 65 
 
Note: Longevity bond is payable from age 90 with terminal payment at age 105 to cover post-105 longevity risk 
 
4.6 Who benefits from Government issuing longevity bonds? 
 
Who benefits from Governments assisting in encouraging the optimal sharing of longevity 
risk? The simple answer is everyone. Everyone should benefit from having a market price for 
longevity risk and the ability to hedge systematic longevity risk. But there are also more 
specific benefits. 
The Government: 
 Gains by having both a more secure DC pension savings market and a more efficient 
annuity market, resulting in less means-tested benefits and a higher tax take 
 Should gain access to a new source of long-term funding which, by widening the 
investor base, lowers the cost of Government issuance 
 Is able to issue bonds with a deferred payment structure to help its current funding 
programme and improve its cash flow 
 Earns a market-determined longevity risk premium thereby further reducing the 
expected cost of the long-term national debt. 
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Defined benefit (DB) pension schemes: 
 Have the opportunity to reduce longevity risks 
 Can hedge longevity risk exposure prior to buy out. 
Insurers: 
 Can potentially establish a mark-to-market mortality rate term structure867 and 
hence hold the optimal level of economic capital or at least hold capital closer to the 
economic level 
 Longevity bonds will help insurers to play an aggregating role in providing pension 
schemes and individuals with longevity insurance, whilst being able to pass on a 
proportion of their risk to the capital market; this would reduce their longevity 
concentration risk and facilitate the spread of longevity risk around the capital 
markets. 
The capital markets: 
 Get help to kick start market participation through the establishment of reliable 
longevity indices and key price points on the longevity risk term structure 
 Can build on this longevity risk term structure with liquid longevity derivatives. 
Investors: 
 Get access to a new (longevity-linked) asset class whose returns are uncorrelated 
with traditional asset classes, such as bonds, equities and real estate. 
Regulators: 
 A longevity risk term structure should help the insurers’ regulator (the Prudential 
Regulation Authority) validate insurers’ economic capital, thereby making regulation 
more robust 
 Longevity bonds should help an orderly transfer of longevity risk from DB schemes to 
the capital markets, thereby reducing reliance on an uncertain sponsor covenant and 
reducing concentration risk amongst insurers, and, in turn, giving comfort to the 
pension schemes’ regulator 
 A longevity risk term structure should help facilitate the calculation of the risk-based 
levy to the Pension Protection Fund.868 
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Pension scheme members: 
 DB pension scheme members potentially get better security 
 DC pension scheme members get better valued annuities which produce a higher 
lifetime income when they retire 
 Further, individuals with DC pension schemes would have a means of hedging the 
longevity risk associated with purchasing an annuity at retirement.  
The potential demand for longevity bonds is high: of the £1.3trn in DB private-sector 
pension liabilities, around £600bn relate to pensions in payment; of the approximately 
£600bn in accumulated DC pension assets, £200bn relate to people over age 55; and 
insurance companies are committed to making annuity payments valued in excess of 
£150bn.  
4.7 Support for Government issuance of longevity bonds 
Support for Governments to issue longevity bonds is growing steadily, not only in the UK, 
where the situation is most immediate, but also internationally.  
The Pensions Commission suggested the Government should consider the use of longevity 
bonds to absorb tail risk for those over 90 or 95, provided it exits from other forms of 
longevity risk pre-retirement which it has done by linking state pension age to increases in 
life expectancy and by raising the future state pension age from 65 to 68 by 2046. ‘One 
possible limited role for Government may, however, be worth consideration: the absorption 
of the ‘extreme tail’ of longevity risk post-retirement, i.e., uncertainty about the mortality 
experience of the minority of people who live to very old ages, say, beyond 90 or beyond 
95’.869 
The Confederation of British Industry, which represents employers, has argued: 
‘Government should drive development of a market in longevity bonds, a similar instrument 
to annuities, by which the payments on the bonds depend on the proportion of a reference 
population that is still surviving at the date of payment of each coupon. This should be done 
through limited seed capital and supporting policy work on the topic. Government could 
also consider how best to match government bond issues to pension scheme needs, 
including the provision of more long-dated bonds and whether Government should issue 
mortality bonds itself’.870 
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According to the OECD: ‘Governments could improve the market for annuities by issuing 
longevity indexed bonds and by producing a longevity index’.871 
The World Economic Forum has argued: ‘Given the ongoing shift towards defined 
contribution pension arrangements, there will be a growing need for annuities to enhance 
the security of retirement income. Longevity-indexed bonds and markets for hedging 
longevity risk would therefore play a critical role in ensuring an adequate provision of 
annuities’.872  
The IMF states: ‘Although the private sector will further develop market-based transfer 
mechanisms for longevity risk if it recognises the benefits of doing so, the Government has a 
potential role in supporting this market. Measures could include provision of better 
longevity data, better regulation and supervision, and education to promote awareness of 
longevity risk. Those Governments that are able to limit their own longevity risk could 
consider issuing a limited quantity of longevity bonds to jumpstart the market’. 873 
Finally, Bernhard Brunner, Director of risklab at Allianz, argues: ‘An injection of liquidity is 
therefore imperative. This is where Governments can come in. By issuing standardised 
longevity bonds index-based on the country’s own population, Governments can make 
prices publicly available. These would then be used as reference points for other 
transactions and assist the growth of the longevity derivatives market, solving the problem 
of transparency that is also holding the market back in current over-the-counter 
deals….Government-issued longevity bonds could also help remove two other obstacles: 
standardisation and education’. 874 
4.8 Arguments against Government issuance of longevity bonds 
A number of arguments have been raised against the issuance of longevity bonds by 
Governments. 
The first is that Governments are not natural issuers of longevity bonds because of their 
large existing exposure – in excess of £5trn in the case of the UK Government875 – to 
longevity risk.   
Our response to this is that a Government’s exposure to unanticipated longevity 
improvements through the issuance of longevity bonds is – or at least could be – well 
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hedged. First, the Government receives a longevity risk premium from issuing the bonds. 
Second, in the event that the risk premium proves to be insufficient, the Government can 
reduce its state pension spend and increase its pre-retirement tax take by systematically 
raising the state pension age in line with increases in life expectancy, as recommended by 
the Pensions Commission. The next generation might have to work longer, but will, in any 
case, have ended up being a fitter generation than the previous one and so be able to earn 
more income which, in turn, will produce more tax. Third, since the issuance of longevity 
bonds should result in a more efficient annuity market and hence higher incomes in 
retirement, this should also result in an increase in the tax take and help to reduce the 
amount of means-tested benefits. In addition, it should be noted that the higher tax take 
and lower means-tested benefits arising from a more efficient annuity market applies to the 
lifetimes of all pensioners buying an annuity, whereas the tail risk protection provided by 
deferred tail longevity bonds applies only to those surviving over 90, some 25 years in the 
future.  
Overall, once a Government is only issuing deferred tail longevity bonds, the risk will be very 
manageable and consistent with the Government’s role of facilitating intergenerational risk 
sharing. There could be a significant cost-benefit to the Government from the issuance of 
longevity bonds and therefore a strong case for a Government to issue longevity bonds.  
The second argument is that there is no role at all for a Government in issuing longevity 
bonds as argued by Dowd (2003) and Brown and Orszag (2006).876  
Dowd (2003) criticised the original argument used by Blake and Burrows (2001)877 to justify 
government issuance of longevity bonds (or what Blake and Burrows called survivor bonds), 
namely the appeal to the Arrow-Lind Theorem on social risk bearing. This theorem states 
that by dispersing an aggregate risk across the population (of taxpayers) as a whole, the 
associated risk premium on a longevity bond issued by the Government would be lower 
than that charged by a private-sector issuer. Dowd countered that many of the assumptions 
underlying the theorem – such as taxes are costless to collect, each household bears an 
equal share of the tax burden, and an absence of distributional effects – do not hold in 
practice. Instead, he argued that capital markets are better suited than any Government to 
bear and share risks, since they allow risks to be diversified internationally. In short, Dowd 
argued that Government intervention was unnecessary, since private-sector parties were 
perfectly capable of creating and trading longevity-linked instruments and derivatives 
themselves. There was no market failure for the Government to correct, rather the time is 
not yet ripe: ‘The fact that a particular innovation has not yet occurred does not in itself 
                                                     
876
 Kevin Dowd (2003), Survivor Bonds: A Comment on Blake and Burrows, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 70, 
339-348; Jeffrey Brown and Peter Orszag (2006) The Political Economy of Government-Issued Longevity Bonds, 
Journal of Risk and Insurance, 73, 611-631. 
877
 David Blake and William Burrows (2001) Survivor Bonds: Helping to Hedge Mortality Risk, Journal of Risk 
and Insurance, 68, 339-348. 
461 
 
constitute an argument for Government intervention to bring it about. Any good new idea, 
including that of survivor derivatives, should eventually take off – but we have to give it 
time.... When the time is ripe, it is therefore entirely possible, and even likely, that markets 
for survivor derivatives – survivor bonds, forwards, futures, options and swaps, and annuity 
securitisation – will take off, and eventually become as familiar as comparable instruments 
such as credit derivatives are today’ (pp. 347-8). 
Brown and Orszag (2006) also accept that a longevity risk premium would need to be paid in 
order to hedge aggregate longevity risk, but they argue that it is not sufficiently high to 
cause a market failure and hence justify Government intervention: ‘we suspect that this risk 
does exert some upward pressure on annuity pricing, possibly in the range of a few 
percentage points’ (p. 622).  They also accept that the intergenerational sharing of longevity 
risk can potentially improve social welfare.  Suppose a scientific discovery improves the life 
expectancy of all current and future generations. Current 80-year olds would be unable to 
respond to this by re-entering the labour market and hence would experience a lower 
standard of living as their remaining wealth would have to be spread over a longer period. 
Younger generations are more able to adjust to this mortality shock. Hence the financial risk 
from such a shock could be spread over a number of generations and this would improve 
social welfare. Since only the Government is able to enforce intergenerational contracts, 
there is a potential role for the Government in efficiently spreading risk across generations. 
However, Brown and Orszag believe that it is unlikely that the Government will spread risk 
efficiently: ‘to maximise social welfare, it is not sufficient that the Government move any 
amount of risk from the current generation to some other generation. Rather, the 
Government needs to move the optimal amount of risk onto the right generations’ (p. 625).  
Instead, they believe that the Government will favour the current generation of voters, and 
particularly the large number of vocal grey voters, over generations as yet unborn, by 
transferring ‘more than the optimal amount of risk to future generations’ (p. 629).878    
We would argue that there is a role for both Government and the private sector in 
developing a longevity market. The private sector is best at hedging idiosyncratic longevity 
risk, once it has hedged systematic longevity risk. The Government is the only agent in 
society with both the capacity and credibility to provide a long-term hedge for systematic 
longevity risk through the issuance of longevity bonds. While Dowd, Brown and Orszag 
highlight some of the difficulties associated with the Government’s ability to forecast future 
mortality improvements, the existence of longevity bonds would provide an incentive for 
the Government to collect better death records and improve its longevity forecasting 
techniques, both of which would have wider social benefits. Even if the private sector is 
better at forecasting than the Government, systematic longevity is a slowly building trend 
risk and the private-sector issuer of a longevity bond risks insolvency if it gets that trend 
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wrong in a way that the Government with its powers of taxation does not. We also need to 
deal with the possibility that ‘more than the optimal amount of risk’ is transferred to future 
generations. However, the total likely issuance of longevity bonds is never going to be 
sufficient for this to be a serious problem and we should bear in mind that the current 
generation is getting its longevity risk insurance for free: if longevity bonds were issued, it 
would have to start paying for it. 
The third criticism is that even if longevity bonds are issued by the Government, there is a 
question mark concerning the potential liquidity of the market trading longevity bonds. 
Some have argued that liquidity is likely to be thin, since any new information concerning 
mortality that would be sufficiently significant to motivate trading is likely to arrive very 
infrequently. While this is true, we believe that there are important lessons from the 
inflation-linked financial futures market. Early attempts to introduce such a market were 
initially unsuccessful but they eventually succeeded and inflation indices have similar 
characteristics to longevity indices, especially in their low frequency of publication.  
The first attempt occurred when CPI futures contracts were listed on the US Coffee, Sugar 
and Cocoa Exchange in June 1985. This contract was delisted in April 1987, with only 10,000 
contracts ever having been traded. The key reasons for the failure of this contract were: 
there was no underlying inflation-linked securities market at the time, the underlying was an 
infrequently published (i.e., monthly) index, and there was no stable pricing relationship 
with other instruments to attract the attention of arbitrageurs. The second attempt 
occurred when Treasury inflation-protected securities (TIPS) futures were listed on the 
Chicago Board of Trade in June 1997 and subsequently delisted before the end of the year 
with only 22 contracts ever traded. The key reasons for the failure of this contract were: 
TIPS had only started trading five months before, there was just a single 10-year TIPS 
trading, the futures contract competed with the underlying for liquidity, and there was 
uncertainty over the future of the TIPS program. The final attempt was in February 2004 
when the Chicago Mercantile Exchange launched a CPI futures contract which is still trading. 
The reasons for the success of this contract are: inflation-linked securities have gained 
acceptance amongst investors, TIPs have evolved into recognised asset class, there is a well-
understood pricing relationship allowing for arbitrage opportunities between TIPS, fixed-
interest Treasury bonds and CPI futures, the US Treasury is committed to long-term TIPS 
issuance, CPI futures do not compete directly with but rather complement TIPS and use 
same the inflation index, and liquidity is enhanced by electronic trading on Globex. This 
experience therefore suggests that it is possible to create a liquid market in an instrument 
based on an infrequently published index. 
The fourth criticism is that longevity bonds are unnecessary since the load factor built into 
annuity prices is sufficiently large to (a) absorb the increase in regulatory capital that will be 
required after the introduction of Solvency II in the absence of longevity bonds, and (b) to 
absorb the longevity risk in countries not subject to Solvency II (e.g., the US and Australia). 
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Our response is that there is limited scope for annuity providers to absorb either the costs 
of the additional capital requirements or the aggregate longevity risk without seriously 
reducing the money’s worth of the annuities they sell.879 
The life annuity market in the UK has scale880 and as a consequence is price competitive 
with a number of life insurers competing for business. It is relatively easy for pensioners to 
compare the different guaranteed incomes on offer in exchange for their pension savings.  
In recent years, the money’s worth of the UK annuity market has been assessed and tracked 
by Edmund Cannon and Ian Tonks. They were commissioned by the Department for Work 
and Pensions in 2009 to produce a detailed report on the money’s worth of annuities in the 
UK. Their report examines a time series of pension annuity rates in the UK for the period 
1994 to 2007. ‘The report computes the money’s worth of annuities and finds that, on 
average, the money’s worth over the sample period for 65-year old males has been 90 per 
cent, and for 65-year old females has been a similar but slightly larger 91 per cent. Taking 
into account load factors associated with annuity contracts and, in comparison with other 
financial and insurance products, this implies that annuities are fairly priced’.881  
Cannon and Tonks’ analysis shows that there is some evidence that the money’s worth has 
fallen since 2002. They discuss a number of reasons for this, including: changes in insurance 
regulation, changes in industrial concentration, an insurance cycle, the pricing in of 
increased mortality uncertainty, and the growth in the impaired lives market. The last of 
these is becoming an increasingly important factor in the UK and it has resulted in the 
money’s worth for standard annuities (i.e., those for healthy lives) falling as insurance 
companies have made allowance for the selection effects caused by the introduction of 
enhanced rates for pensioners with health impairments that reduce their expected life 
expectancy. Around 30-40% of pensioners qualify for enhanced annuity rates and life 
insurers have adjusted the rates on standard annuities to reflect the longer life expectancy 
of the 60-70% buying standard annuities. The other main reason is that UK insurers have 
increased the loading for the cost of their risk capital to reflect the fact that they expect to 
have to hold more capital in a Solvency II world. This trend has accelerated since 2009 in 
anticipation of the introduction of Solvency II in 2016. In short, the load factor in annuities 
                                                     
879
 The money’s worth of an annuity will equal 100% when annuity providers have no administrative costs and 
are making no profits.  In practice, the money’s worth will be less than 100% due to the presence of 
administrative costs, risk charges (in form of cost of capital) and the need for annuity providers to make a 
‘normal profit’. The sum of the costs and normal profit is called the ‘load factor’. 
880
 At its peak, the UK annuity market was worth about £12bn a year in new business – around  half of the 
global annuity market – sales have fallen by more than 50% since the 2014 Budget. 
881 Edmund Cannon and Ian Tonks (2009, xiii) Money’s Worth of Pension Annuities, Department for Work and 
Pensions, Research Report No 563.  Cannon and Tonks’ findings are supported by a more recent study by the 
FCA: Matteo Aquilina, Robert Baker and Tommaso Majer (2014), The Value for Money of Annuities and Other 
Retirement Income Strategies in the UK, Financial Conduct Authority, Occasional Paper No. 5, December 
(http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/occasional-papers/occasional-paper-5.pdf) 
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cannot take much more strain without adversely impacting the size of the annuity 
payments. 
The fifth and final criticism that we consider is that basis risk is sufficiently large that it 
would negate any gains from holding longevity bonds.  
We recognise that basis risk is an important issue. There will be a requirement under 
Solvency II for annuity companies to hold capital to cover basis risk where they have a 
hedging instrument that is not perfect. However, given that no longevity bonds have yet 
been issued,882 no annuity provider has been in a position to agree the scale of capital 
required with its regulator. The level of capital will clearly depend on the composition and 
size of the insurer’s annuity population. However, reinsurers who are also caught by 
Solvency II would be more able to consolidate exposure by pooling portfolios from different 
providers and therefore experience less basis risk. It is possible that reinsurers could end up 
using longevity bonds to manage their longevity risk and reduce their Solvency II capital 
requirement, whilst providing indemnity rather than indexed solutions to insurers with 
small pools of annuities. 
Whilst it is hard to be absolutely sure at this stage in the development of the market, we do 
not believe that basis risk means that longevity bonds will be ineffective. Basis risk arises in 
other markets where imperfect hedging instruments are used, such as interest rate and 
currency futures contracts. Using these contracts leads to both contemporaneous and time 
basis risk,883 but this does not prevent them from providing highly effective – if not perfect – 
hedges.  
 
4.9 Feedback from our interviews and responses to the consultation paper 
4.9.1 Feedback from our interviews 
We asked the providers and investment managers that we interviewed about their views on 
longevity bonds. The question gave rise to opposing views, of which the following are 
typical: 
 ‘They would be helpful due to long tail of risk and duration of assets. There are not 
enough long-term bonds. But the return on government bonds is not attractive’ 
                                                     
882
 While not a longevity bond of the kind we have discussed above, we should note that Swiss Re issued the 
world’s first ‘longevity trend’ bond in 2010. This was designed to hedge the difference in the trend increases in 
life expectancy in the UK and the US. This bond is discussed in detail in Andrew Hunt and David Blake (2015) 
Modelling Longevity Bonds: Analysing the Swiss Re Kortis Bond, Insurance: Mathematics & Economics, 63(C), 
12-29.  
883
 Contemporaneous basis risk implies that the hedging instrument is not a derivative of the underlying; time 
basis risk implies that the maturity of the hedging instrument does not coincide with the maturity of the 
underlying.  
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 ‘[Our company – an insurance company] does not see a demand, but we accept the 
point that there is currently no market price for longevity risk (and everyone’s pricing 
is based on an actuarial model)’.  
4.9.2 Responses to the consultation paper 
We summarise the responses to Questions 32-40 in the consultation paper here. 
32. What evidence is there of individuals’ ability to reliably estimate how long they are 
going to live? 
33. How easy is it for individuals to quantify longevity risk? What evidence is available on 
this question? 
Respondents were unanimous that individuals had problems estimating both life expectancy 
– with a tendency to under-estimate it – and longevity risk. A minority thought that these 
problems could be overcome with education or engagement. 
34. Is longevity risk a risk that individual savers are able – and should be expected – to 
manage themselves? 
The majority of respondents thought that individuals could not manage longevity risk 
adequately, and pointed to solutions in the form of longevity insurance, annuities and 
guaranteed drawdown. A minority thought that individuals could manage longevity risk if 
they received some additional help. 
35. Where people receive tax incentives to save into pensions, should people be required 
to secure a minimum lifetime income in retirement? 
Respondents were split on whether people who had received tax incentives should secure 
an income in retirement or not. Just over a quarter said “yes”, while just over a third said 
“no”. Others thought that tax relief could be used to encourage people to buy longevity 
insurance after retirement. Some thought that the use of tax relief in pensions should be 
reviewed, especially since it did not benefit those on low or modest incomes. 
36. (a) Do you believe that the DC retirement income market could benefit from the 
introduction of a market in longevity bonds? Explain. (b) Do you believe that a market in 
longevity bonds is viable (in the sense of having sufficient demand to justify its introduction)? 
Explain. 
37. Do you have a preferred design for a longevity bond?  
38. Is there a case for the Government to issue longevity bonds? Explain. 
There were two interpretations of these questions on longevity bonds. Where longevity 
bonds were interpreted as products issued by the Government to allow insurance 
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companies to hedge mortality risk, a majority were in favour of government issuance, 
although a minority did not believe they would work. Where longevity bonds were 
intepreted as retail products (i.e., a form of deferred annuity) purchased by individuals 
(perhaps from the Post Office or National Savings & Investments), many respondents 
thought that this would be a good idea. 
39. Are there alternatives to longevity bonds to hedge systematic longevity risk? Explain. 
There were only two replies to whether there are alternatives to longevity bonds to hedge 
systematic longevity risk, one saying “no” and the other saying “yes, but it would probably 
be expensive.” 
40. Are there other ways of helping savers to manage longevity risk? 
Most responses thought that savers could not manage longevity risk without some form of 
annuity or guaranteed drawdown. A significant minority thought that better education and 
engagement would improve the chances of individuals dealing with longevity risk. 
4.10 Analysis and recommendation 
The evidence that we have put forward in this Chapter suggests that longevity risk is a risk 
that individual savers are not able – and should not be expected – to manage themselves. 
They need help to manage this risk in a cost-effective way, while retaining flexibility in 
spending and the investment growth potential of retirement assets in the early years of 
retirement.  
Our analysis provides further support for Recommendation 3.1 in Chapter 3, namely a quasi-
default decumulation plan, involving drawdown plus longevity insurance in the form of a 
deferred annuity (as one option). However, the providers of longevity insurance face 
systematic longevity risk for which there is currently no suitable hedging instrument, namely 
a longevity bond, being traded. 
We make one recommendation as a result of the analysis in this Chapter: 
 
Recommendation 4.1: Longevity bonds working party  
Since longevity bonds have a potentially important role to play in hedging systematic 
longevity risk, we recommend that the Government sets up a working party to undertake 
a cost-benefit analysis of government issuance of longevity bonds to help manage the 
associated longevity risk exposure.  
The terms of reference of the working party would cover the benefits that would accrue to 
all stakeholders, the scale of the longevity risk that Governments would be assuming, the 
actions Governments can take to mitigate this risk, and the issue of inter-generational 
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equity. The working party should also work through the practicalities of issuing longevity 
bonds, including the construction of reference longevity indices, potential demand, pricing, 
liquidity and taxation.884 
  
                                                     
884
 Since longevity bonds are annuity bonds with the coupon payment involving a return of capital element as 
well as an interest element, the tax treatment will therefore be more complicated than with a conventional 
bond. 
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